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Background: Previous studies have indicated that the temporal lobe is involved in theory of mind (ToM). However,
little attention has been paid to ToM in patients with cerebral infarction. In this study, we investigated the ability of
ToM in patients with temporal lobe cerebral infarction (TLCI) using a variety of tests.
Methods: In the study, 19 patients with TLCI and 20 healthy controls (HC) were examined using the Recognition of
faux pas and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) tasks, to assess their ability of ToM.
Results: The results of the study indicated that the TLCI group performed significantly worse compared with the
HC group as revealed in the total faux pas-related score and in emotion recognition (Mind Reading).
Conclusions: Our results implied that patients with TLCI had difficulty in ToM. Our data provided new evidence
that the temporal lobe may be involved in processing ToM inferences.
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Social cognition is defined as the process that modulates
behaviour in response to conspecifics and, in particular,
to the higher cognitive processes that subserve the ex-
tremely diverse and flexible social behaviours that are
observed in primates [1]. A core component of social
cognition is the capacity to attribute independent mental
states to others or to predict other people’s behaviour
based on their mental states, a capacity that is known as
theory of mind (ToM) [2]. It can enable us to interact in
complex social environments and to engage in the activ-
ities that we value most, such as family, friendship, love,
and cooperation. Accordingly, impairments in ToM can
have a serious negative effect on interpersonal relation-
ships, employment, and social interactions [3,4].
Previous studies showed that traumatic brain injury
[5] and various psychiatric disorders, including autism
[6] and depression [7], are accompanied by deficits in
ToM. Human lesion [5,8] and neuroimaging studies
[1,9,10] have been pivotal in attempts to explore the
neural substrate of aspects of ToM, such as the ability to* Correspondence: wangkai1964@yahoo.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orrecognize the emotional expressions and the reasons
underlying the mental states of others. Evidence from
several studies performed in both primates and humans
suggested that the temporal lobe is involved in ToM and
the recognition of emotion [11-14]. One of the first
studies of higher-order ToM, which was reported by
Schacher, found that patients with mesial temporal lobe
epilepsy (MTLE) have impairments in their ability to
recognize a faux pas, which is an advanced ToM task
[15]. That study indicated that patients with MTLE, both
pre- and postoperatively, performed significantly worse
on the Faux pas test compared with patients with
extramesiotemporal lobe epilepsy and healthy controls
(HC), suggesting that MTLE is a specific aetiology of
deficits in higher-order social cognition. Regarding the
recognition of emotions, patients with anterior temporal
lobectomy have deficits in emotion recognition [16].
Similarly, a few studies showed that patients with tem-
poral lobe epilepsy had deficits in the ability to recognise
emotions, ToM, and decision making [11,17-19]. These
studies confirmed that widespread deficits in social cog-
nition are common in MTLE. Moreover, a growing body
of neuroimaging evidence has shown that the temporal
pole was activated by a variety of stimuli: moral judg-
ments, socio-emotional stories and sounds evoking aThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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logical studies [11,18,19] examined ToM in individuals
with MTLE, and functional neuroimaging studies [9,21]
demonstrated that the temporal lobe was involved in
ToM, fewer studies have explored the effects of temporal
lobe cerebral infarction (TLCI) on ToM [22]. A study
performed by Happe et al. [22] showed that people with
right hemisphere (including the temporal lobe) stoke
exhibited specific impairments in understanding stories
and cartoons that require mental-state attribution. In
addition, Weed et al. [23] reported on patients with right
hemisphere stroke who had difficulty discriminating be-
tween film categories and a bias toward reduced mental-
state ascription in the ToM condition. However, the
location of the lesion in those patients was not limited
to the right temporal lobe, and results from previous
studies have not provided any conclusive evidence re-
garding the involvement of the temporal lobes in ToM.
Hence, based on the results of previous studies, the aim
of the present study was to investigate ToM in patients
with TLCI using a variety of tests, including the Recogni-
tion of faux pas and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
(RME) tasks. One Study from Pellicano et al. [24] showed
that ToM development relied on executive function in
children. Carlson et al. [25] implicated that inhibition con-
trol and working memory might be central to the relation
between executive function and false belief understanding.
Saxe and colleagues [26] have identified both separated
and overlapping brain structures involved in ToM and ex-
ecutive function, suggesting that both domain general and
domain specific cognitive resources are involved in ToM.
In contrast, some lesion studies showed that ToM impair-
ment was independent of executive function in adults
[27,28]. Previous studies have shown that executive func-
tion might play an important role in ToM emergence dur-
ing childhood, but mature theory of mind ability might
not rely on executive functions [26]. However, a relation-
ship between ToM and executive function or memory
function has not been reported in patients with TLCI.
Thus, we tested the relationship between other cognition
functions and ToM in patients with TLCI.
Methods
Participants
The participants included 19 patients (3 females and 16
males) diagnosed with unilateral TLCI via head high-
resolution magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). All patients
were recruited from the Department of Neurology of
the Third Affiliated Hospital of the Anhui Medical Univer-
sity. Exclusion criteria were current, or a history of, sub-
stance abuse, current or previous psychiatric diagnoses,
colour blindness, intelligence quotient (IQ) as estimated
using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
Chinese Version (WAIS-RC) [29] below 80 (representingintellectual impairment), and history of diffuse brain dam-
age. Sociodemographic-related information is summarized
in Table 1. Among those 19 patients, 15 patients had
structural brain damage within the right-side temporal
lobe and 4 patients had left-side temporal lobe damage.
Additionally, we recruited 20 healthy volunteers (7 females
and 13 males, for the HC group) with similar cultural and
demographic characteristics to those of the patients. They
had no history of neurological problems, history of sub-
stance abuse, current or previous psychiatric diagnoses,
colour blindness, or severe head injury. All subjects
were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-nor-
mal vision. The study was approved by the Anhui Medical
University Ethics Committee, and participants gave writ-
ten informed consent before the study and received finan-
cial compensation for participating in the experiment.
Background and neuropsychological testing
The following neuropsychological tests were administered
to all subjects and compared between the HC group and
the patients with TLCI: (1) full neurological examination,
including the NIH Stroke Scale (NIHSS), was performed by
a certified investigator to assess the neurological state of pa-
tients with TLCI [30]; (2) the Mini-Mental State Examin-
ation (MMSE) [31] was used to measure global cognitive
functions; (3) the Hamilton Depression Scale [32] was used
to measure depressive states; (4) verbal fluency (number of
animals named/min) [33] was used to measure frontal
functions; (5) the Go-No-Go task was used to estimate the
ability of inhibitory control [34]; (6) the Digit Span test [29]
was used to estimate short-term memory and executive
function, including digital forward and digital backward;
and (7) the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT)
[35] was used to evaluate verbal memory.
ToM tasks
Recognition of faux pas task: We used the previously
published faux pas task [36] and adapted Stone’s Faux
Pas task [37]. A faux pas occurs when a person unwit-
tingly says something that should not have been said be-
cause it could hurt the listener’s feelings. An example of
a social faux pas story is as follows:
‘Lijing was at Wangfang’s home. While appreciating a
crystal vase that she gave Wangfang as a birthday gift,
she accidentally dropped the vase to the ground, which
was then shattered into pieces. Lijing felt really sorry
about breaking the vase. Wangfang said, “Don’t worry
about it. I never like this vase anyway.”’
In total, 10 faux pas stories were used in our study. The
test administrator read the story aloud while the participant
followed the story using his or her own print copy. After
each story, the subject was asked a series of questions:
Table 1 Demographic, neuropsychological tests for the TLCI and HCs groups [mean (SD)]
TLCI HCs Statistics value P Value
Age[years] 55.16 (14.04) 56(6.74) F(1,37)=0.058 0.81
Gender (M,F) 16,3 13,7 — 0.35
Education[years] 10.11(3.33) 10.95(2.31) F(1,37)=0.89 0.35
Time Since Lesion [days] 36.42(8.91) — — —
IQ 97.84(8.03) 100.5(7.81) F(1,37)=1.09 0.32
NIH Stroke Scale 4.68(2.94) — — —
MMSE 29.0 (0.75) 29.25 (0.85) F(1,37)=0.94 0.35
HAMD 2.95 (0.91) 2.5 (1.19) F(1,37)=1.72 0.19
verbal fluency 15.21 (3.08) 17.45 (4.88) F(1,37)=2.89 0.09
Go-No-Go task 2.0(0.58) 2.6(0.5) F(1,37)=12.02 0.001
Forward digit span 5.68(1.16) 6.75 (1.29) F(1,37)=7.33 0.01
Backward digit span 3.37 (1.07) 4.9 (1.68) F(1,37)=11.39 0.002
AVLT
Trial 5 8.95 (1.90) 11.05(2.19) F(1,37)=10.22 0.003
Delay recall 8.32 (2.08) 9.7(2.38) F(1,37)=3.71 0.06
Delay recognition 12.89(1.37) 13.65(1.63) F(1,37)=2.44 0.13
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should not have said?
Question 2: who said something he (or she) should
not have said?
Question 3: why should he (or she) not have said it?
Question 4: why did he (or she) say it?
The last question (Question 5) was a control for story
comprehension. Participants were asked a question
about some important detail of the story without making
inferences about the mental state of others.
After each story, participants were asked Question 1
(detecting the faux pas). If the participants answered yes,
then they were asked Question 2 (identifying the correct
person). If the participants identified the correct person,
they were classified as having correctly identified the
faux pas. Then, 2 follow-up questions were asked: Ques-
tion 3 (testing that the participant understood that the
listener would be hurt or insulted, which is an inference
about the mental state of the listener) and Question 4
(testing that the participant understood that the faux pas
was unintentional, which is an inference about the men-
tal state of the speaker). If the subject answered No to
Question 1, Questions 2–4 were skipped and Question 5
was immediately presented. In such cases, Questions 2–
4 were assigned zero points. For scoring, we assigned 1
point for each correct response, producing scores for in-
dividual faux-pas–related scores (sum of the scores for
questions 1–4 of all 10 stories). The scores on the 4
faux-pas–related questions indicated the general ability
of participants to understand and represent the mental
state of others. The faux-pas–related questions can be
broken down further into 2 kinds of questions thatdetermine whether or not the participant has correctly
identified the faux pas and understood the faux pas [37]:
Questions 1 and 2, which identified the faux pas (sum of
the scores for questions 1 and 2 obtained for the 10 stor-
ies), and the scores for individual questions 3 and 4,
which represented the understanding of the faux pas
(sum of the scores for questions 3 and 4 of all 10 stor-
ies). All these scores were converted into a percentage of
correct responses.
RME task: We used a previously published task for the
evaluation of the expression of emotions in the eyes [7],
i.e., an affective ToM task. A Chinese version of the
Reading the Mind in Eyes task (RME) derived from
Baron-Cohen [38]. This task comprises 34 photographs
of Asians exhibiting various facial expressions, showing
only the eye region (black-and-white photographs, 15 ×
6 cm). For each eye region, participants were asked to
choose from words that could describe the complicated
emotion expression: 1 correct and 3 foil words. There
were no time limits. At the same time, subjects were also
asked to judge the gender of each person in each photo,
as a control task. Before the formal test, we confirmed
that the subjects were able to understand these words
through vocabulary learning. The maximum score a sub-
ject could receive on the RME and gender recognition
task was 34.
Statistical analyses
Analyses were carried out using SPSS Version 11.5. Test
scores are presented as means with standard errors. Ef-
fects were considered significant at p < 0.05. Normally
distributed data were analysed using one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA). In the remaining cases, data were
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Correlations between dependent variables were tested
using Pearson’s correlation.Results
Background and neuropsychological testing
All patients had unilateral structural damage within the
temporal lobe, as revealed by high-resolution MRI. Le-
sions were overlapped using MRIcrov.1.25 (http://www.
mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricro/index.html) (see
Figure 1). The lesion volume in the TLCI group was
32.66 ± 30.01 cc. The background and neuropsycho-
logical data of the TLCI and the HC groups are shown
in Table 1. One-way ANOVA confirmed the absence of
significant differences between the TLCI and the HC
groups in terms of IQ, MMSE score, HAMD score, ver-
bal fluency, and RAVLT delay recall and delay recogni-
tion (all p >0.05). As shown in Table 1, One-way
ANOVA revealed significant group differences on mea-
sures of inhibitory control, digit span, and RAVLT trial 5
(all p < 0.05) (see Table 1).ToM tasks
The results of these tests indicated that the TLCI group
performed significantly worse on ToM compared with the
HC group, as revealed in the total faux-pas–related scores
(U = 59, p < 0.001). We found no significant differences
between the TLCI and the HC groups regarding the con-
trol question (U = 170, p = 0.141). A separate analysis of
the 2 kinds of faux pas questions—identifying the faux pas
and understanding the faux pas—revealed other interesting
findings. We observed no significant group differences in
the questions aimed at identifying the faux pas (U = 146.5,
p = 0.208). However, we found that there was a significantFigure 1 Composite images of damaged brain regions in the group o
in a subject are shown in purple; warmer shades denote the degree to whdifference in the questions aimed at testing the under-
standing of the faux pas (U = 25, p < 0.001) (see Figure 2).
The RME task revealed the presence of a significant dif-
ference between the 2 groups, as the TLCI group
performed worse than the HC group in emotion recogni-
tion (Mind Reading) (U = 0.00, p < 0.001). However, we
found that there was no significant difference between the
groups regarding gender recognition (U = 135.5, p =
0.114). These results suggest that patients with TLCI had
difficulties representing the mental state of others based
on eye expressions (see Figure 3).Correlation analysis
In this study, we also addressed the question of whether
the deficit in ToM observed in patients with TLCI could
be related to the neuropsychological test. Pearson’s correl-
ation analyses were performed between tasks for this
group. The only significant relationships found were those
between the total faux-pas–related scores and the RAVLT
trial 5 (r = 0.51, p = 0.02) (see Table 2). Since the patients
not only had an impairment in faux-pas task but also in
short term memory and inhibition performance, we used
these factors as control factors for further partial correl-
ation analysis. The results showed that there was still a
correlation between the total faux-pas–related scores and
the RAVLT trial 5 (Partial r=0.53, p = 0.02). However, we
found that there was no significant relationship between
the total faux-pas–related scores and the RAVLT trial 5 in
the HC group(r = 0.16, p = 0.51). We found that there was
no significant relationship between the faux-pas scores
and the RME task. In addition, we found that there were
no significant correlations between the ToM tasks and
neuropsychological test in the control group (all p > 0.05)
(see Table 3).f patients with temporal lobe cerebral infarction. Areas damaged
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Figure 2 Types of errors made on the faux pas task. The TLCI group had impairment on faux-pas–related questions. The figure indicates that
patients with TLCI could correctly identify the faux pas and answer the control questions. The TLCI group made more errors in understanding the
mental states of the speakers and listeners than HC (Question 3 and 4) (*p < 0.001 vs. HC).
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This study examined the nature of mentalizing deficits
presented by patients with TLCI, especially with medial
temporal lobes lesions. Our results showed that the TLCI
group had impaired ToM compared with the HC group.
Consistent with previous literatures [11,13], our findings
implied that the temporal lobe was involved in ToM.
The results from this study showed that the TLCI



















Figure 3 Performance in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes
(RME) test. In the RME (emotion recognition) test, the performance
of the TLCI group was worse than that of the HC group. However,
there were no significant differences between the 2 groups in terms
of performance in the gender-recognition task (*p < 0.001 vs. HC).related test and the RME test compared with the HC
group,while its performances on control question and
gender recognition task were relatively normal. ToM
ability can be further divided into 2 subcomponents:
‘cognitive ToM’ and ‘affective ToM’. Since the RME test
is regarded as a classical task to measure affective ToM
based on eye expression, the results of the current study
indicate that affective ToM may be impaired in patients
with temporal lobe infarction. In addition to this obser-
vation, our findings partially confirmed that the impaired
performance on the faux pas test observed in the TLCI
group was mostly related to a significantly worse per-
formance on the question regarding understanding of
the mental states of the speakers and listeners, and not
to identifying the faux pas. Performing a social faux pas
task may involve at least two levels of difficulty in
cognitve loading processes: the identification and the un-
derstanding of a social faux pas. Identification of a social
faux pas with questions 1 and 2 that merely ask whether
the participants noted that there was a faux-pas at all
and relied on the cognitive ToM ability. Understanding
of a social faux pas maybe more requires, in addition, an
empathic appreciation of the speaker’s and listener’s
emotional state (knowledge about emotions). Following
this line of thought, the poor performance on Questions
3 and 4 in patients with TLCI may be related to an in-
crease of the ability to make affective representations of
others’ mental states relative to Questions 1 and 2. The
present study indicated that the TLCI group have a
specific affective ToM deficit, which represented the def-
icit with the integration of emotional information for
ToM. In social interactions, deficits in affective ToM
may limit the TLCI patients’ abilities of understanding



















Eyes gender 0.11 1.00
Total faux pas-related 0.01 0.39 1.00
IQ 0.14 0.01 −0.30 1.00
NIHSS 0.05 −0.17 −0.22 0.08 1.00
MMSE 0.29 0.17 −0.05 0.21 −0.28 1.00
HAMD 0.16 0.30 0.21 −0.43 −0.21 0.16 1.00
Verbal fluency 0.09 −0.10 0.33 0.30 −0.34 −0.15 −0.17 1.00
Trial 5 0.21 0.38 0.51* 0.19 −0.04 0.43 0.06 −0.16 1.00
Delay recall 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.14 −0.23 0.25 −0.20 −0.19 0.62** 1.00
Delay recognition 0.16 −0.20 0.00 −0.08 −0.08 0.38 −0.13 0.18 −0.13 −0.14 1.00
Go-No-Go 0.45 −0.07 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.00 −0.13 0.12 0.10 −0.09 0.07 1.00
Forward digit span 0.35 0.08 −0.03 −0.06 −0.16 0.19 −0.12 0.16 0.17 −0.14 0.29 0.58** 1.00
Backward digit span 0.40 −0.11 0.00 −0.07 0.18 0.00 −0.26 0.14 0.26 −0.16 0.26 0.63** 0.59**
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Subsequently, their social behaviours which are affected
by misinterpretation of the intention to hurt possibly
have an impact on the quality of social interactions and
relationships [39].
Previous studies also showed the temporal lobe was
involved in social emotional functions [40], such as in
the perception of affective empathy of others [41], un-
derstanding of sarcasm [42], emotional expressions [43],














IQ 0.17 −0.02 0.13 1.00
MMSE 0.04 0.30 0.38 0.14 1.00
HAMD 0.37 −0.06 0.00 −0.09 0.49*
Verbal fluency 0.08 −0.24 0.17 0.22 −0.12
Trial 5 0.12 0.17 0.16 0.16 −0.21
Delay recall 0.18 0.06 −0.09 0.14 −0.25
Delay recognition −0.09 −0.16 0.20 0.12 0.03
Go-No-Go 0.20 −0.12 0.08 0.29 −0.25
Forward digit span 0.09 −0.12 0.06 0.15 0.30
Backward digit span 0.22 −0.04 0.24 0.21 0.35
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).also revealed that patients with atrophy in the temporal
pole region [46] and patients with temporal lobe epilepsy
[47,48] impaired in emotion recognition. One study
performed in normal subjects using blood oxygen level-
dependent functional MRI showed that areas including
the temporoparietal junction, the superior temporal lobe,
and the temporal pole were activated in affective empathy
[14]. Our results may provide new evidence in support
of the relationship between the temporal lobe and















0.09 0.16 0.87** 1.00
0.23 0.25 0.43 0.36 1.00
−0.26 0.16 0.45* 0.42 0.01 1.00
0.26 0.17 0.23 0.18 0.66** 0.16 1.00
0.31 0.24 0.26 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.54*
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that the deficit in the faux pas test observed in the TLCI
group is similar to that of patients with dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex lesions described in a previous study [5].
A functional neuroimaging study showed that the ToM
task activated the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
the bilateral temporoparietal junction and the right in-
ferior parietal lobule more than the non-ToM condition
did [10]. Schilbach et al. [49] reported that not only the
left medial basotemporal and right superior temporal
cortex, but also the prefrontal lobe, were activated when
participants viewed socially relevant clips. However, the
deficit in the faux pas test observed in the TLCI group was
different from that of patients with orbitofrontal cortex
damage [8]. Patients with orbitofrontal cortex damage
made errors in detecting faux pas by giving the answer
that nothing awkward was said in the story [8]. Of course,
the prefrontal cortex, together with areas of the temporal
cortex, has been established as a part of the complex net-
work underlying ToM, i.e., the ability to understand that
others have beliefs, desires, and intentions that are differ-
ent from one’s own [50,51]. In the present study the
results indicated that the TLCI group could identify the
occurrence of a faux pas in the story,but they could not
correctly make inferences about the mental state of others.
Therefore, it is conceivable that the deficits in ToM
observed in the TLCI group were due to a disturbance in
the connections of frontotemporal networks. Temporal
lobe stroke may have an effect on higher-order social
behaviour by altering afferents to frontal regions.
In addition, this study showed that patients with TLCI
exhibited impairment not only in ToM, but also in
executive-function subcomponents and memory. Within
the TLCI group, the total faux-pas–related scores were
correlated with RAVLT trial 5, indicating that memory
impairment was associated with ToM. We did not find
any correlation between the RME test or the faux pas test
scores and other cognitive tasks. The results of this study
indicated that the deficit of faux pas with the TLCI group
might be related to auditory verbal memory impairment.
Moreover, a neuroimaging study confirmed the existence
of areas of activity that were common to autobiographical
episodic memory and ToM within the frontal and poster-
ior/medial temporal lobe regions [52]. However, we did
not find that the correlation between the RME task and
RAVLT in the patient group. The social faux pas task fea-
tures verbal material and it requires participants to hold a
large amount of verbal material in working memory in
recognition of faux pas, while the RME task is thought to
reflect a visual affective subcomponent of ToM [53]. The
results from this study indicated that performance on the
RAVLT 5 correlates with the faux pas task might be due
to the verbal material of this task. We found that there
was no correlation between ToM and neuropsychologicaltesting including executive-function subcomponents and
memory in the HC group. Previous studies have demon-
strated development of ToM depends largely on the nor-
mal functioning of executive function memory systems in
childhoods [54]. And some evidences have emerged to
show that the ability of ToM seemed to be independent of
a more cognitive or executive in normal adults [27,55].
The results from the study indicated that the ToM ability
of the normal adults maybe not relied on executive or
memory function. Moreover, the study also indicated that
the RME test not correlated with the scores from the faux
pas. Shamay-Tsoory et al. [56] have identified that the per-
formance in affective ToM tasks was positively related to
their empathic ability, indicating that the ability to make
affective representations of others’ mental states is associ-
ated with the ability to empathize. The faux pas recogni-
tion test is thought to reflect both the cognitive and
affective subcomponents of ToM. A rational explanation
for this would be that performance of the RME test
requires less empathic processing than is needed for the
appreciation of a faux pas.
There are some limitations of our study. First, we could
not use executive-function subcomponents and memory
as covariates for analyses of the differences in ToM per-
formance between groups because the data of the faux pas
or RME was not normally distributed. Another limitation
of the present study was that patients with unilateral le-
sions were not tested for hemispheric specialization for
ToM because of the small sample of patient with left tem-
poral lobe cerebral infarction in our study, although some
researchers pointed out the role of right temporal lobe
structures in social cognition [44,57] and impaired emo-
tion processing and ToM ability in patients with right
hemispheric stroke [23,58]. Moreover, previous studies in-
dicated the presence of gender differences in social cogni-
tion [59]. Unfortunately, the sample size of the female
patients with TLCI was too small to reach any conclusions
of this nature.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the results of the present study imply that
patients with TLCI had difficulty in ToM, special in
affective ToM. Our data contribute to new evidence that
the temporal lobe may be involved in processing ToM
inferences. Additional studies relying on both lesions
and functional neuroimaging are required to elucidate
these questions further in humans.
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